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The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance 1948-1952

Allan K. Henrikson

NATO's 30-year existence has given it almost the character of a familiar statue—we seldom ask how it came to be. This paper looks at the founding of NATO, the treaty, the organizational structure, and the military forces—what conditions required and fostered NATO and why what resulted, rather than something else, did result. It also invites a consideration of two not opposite questions—whether the defense of Europe should be more "Europeanized"; whether NATO should be geographically and functionally broadened.

THE CREATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, 1948-1952

by

Alan K. Henrikson

> And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness *was* upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. Genesis I:2.

On 4 April 1949, at a ceremony in the ornate Departmental Auditorium in Washington, D.C., the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. For all of the 12 parties, European no less than North American, the pact—a peacetime military coalition transoceanic in scope—was unprecedented. Not since the breakup in 1822 of the Quadruple Alliance against a Bonapartist resurgence in France had Europe known such a strong grouping of Great Powers in peace. In 1947 the United States had signed the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro to protect the Western Hemisphere, but it had not been formally linked with any European power since its 1778 Revolutionary War alliance with France dissolved by mutual agreement in 1800.

Probably more than any other international arrangement in history, even the League of Nations and the United Nations, the North Atlantic Alliance has set—not to say in a deeper sense caused—the pattern of international relations that we in the Atlantic world today tend to take for granted. It has been regarded—rightly—as a major core of international stability. "To protect this area against war," declared President Truman at the signing ceremony, "will be a long step toward permanent peace in the whole world."[1]

Nonetheless, there is a growing apprehension that the Atlantic Alliance, confined as it is in membership, geography, and function, may be

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too narrow. President Carter, speaking in May 1977 at Notre Dame University, suggested that Americans' belief in the importance of "an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic" is no longer tenable. There is "a new world"—a world in which the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity, of economic strains in the United States, and, perhaps most important, of nearly 100 new nations, some of them influential, on the continents of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. "We can no longer have a policy solely for the industrial nations as the foundation of global stability, but we must respond to the new reality of a politically awakening world," he declared.[2]

The fluidity of present-day global relations and the difficulty of seeing the best way to recrystallize them suggests that the international situation of the late 1940s—apparently so simple and clear—may have been no less amorphous and confusing than the present era.

It is in order to recover some sense of the uncertainty of international relations during the years in which NATO was formed, and of the possible alternatives to that organization, that I should like to attempt to reconstruct the early history of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948 to 1952. In undertaking such a task, the historian must try to put himself back into the mentality of a period and to look at the world developments as contemporaries did, "remembering" what they remembered and "foreseeing" what they foresaw. At the same time, he must preserve his perspective and critical detachment so as to spot influential ideas and formative events of which those who were "present at the creation" may not have been fully aware.[3]

I shall feel rewarded if, by the end of my account, I have done two things: first, to have given a comprehensive if brief historical explanation of the genesis of NATO—not merely the Treaty itself but NATO's organizational structure and military forces; and, second, to have established a broader basis for considering how the North Atlantic Alliance might perhaps today be reconceived and reconstituted in light of new international circumstances.

There is a certain tension between these two purposes. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of an event like the founding of NATO, one must identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of it—that is, find the factors that permitted and required it, and it in particular. This is not entirely compatible with a search for alternatives—institutional patterns that history might have formed (and that still might be formed today). The historian's tendency is to assume that if something happened there were ample causes and good reasons for its happening—that it could not have been otherwise. Nonetheless, he is also impressed by the irregular course that history often seems to take and by the evidence that those who were involved in setting policy directions have subsequently been convinced that the path to the present might have been much straighter and smoother.

The North Atlantic Alliance is an excellent case in point. There was probably no statesman on either side of the Atlantic in 1948 who foresaw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as it came to be established by late 1952. "At the time of the signing of the Pact, April 4, 1949," later recalled one State Department official, "I do not believe that anyone envisaged the kind of military setup that NATO evolved into and from which de Gaulle withdrew French forces in 1966."[4] Similarly, a Congressional staff member of the period comments: "I often say that none of the senators who voted for the Treaty could possibly have foreseen—even in their wildest dreams—the develop-

ments that turned a simple defensive alliance into the NATO of today with its complex command structure, its communication system, its infrastructure, and so forrh."[5]

The main divergence from the original concept was the stationing in 1951 of additional U.S. ground divisions in Germany, augmenting those still there on occupation duty. This development, coupled with the establishment of an integrated command structure under an American Supreme Commander, made the United States a factor in the very system—the European balance of power—whose independence and self-sufficiency had in times past been America's best security guarantee.[6] Henceforward the United States could not withdraw from the balance in Europe without seeming to upset it. This was not what had been intended. Nor, except perhaps by some Europeans and a few Americans, worried abour Europe's basic political and psychological stability, had it been desired. Today, U.S. military strategists, while proud of their country's achievement in helping to assure Europe 30 years of security, sometimes wonder aloud about the wisdom of the original American troop and command commitment, which severely limits their ability to deploy short supplies of manpower and equipment to other critical zones. One Air Force officer, for instance, bluntly speaks of "the NATO trap" into which the United States somehow got itself.

The Impetus. The story of NATO, properly conceived, begins in the aftermath of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947. At that session it had become unmistakably plain, from Molotov's intransigence, that cooperative Four Power supervision of Germany as a single entity in accord with the 1945 Postdam Agreement was impossible. Thus the American Secretary of State, General George Marshall, "broke up" the conference, as one member of the U.S. delegation recalls Marshall's gesture. Before leaving London, Marshall had a last conversation with Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who sounded him out on an idea he had. "There is no chance," Bevin said, "that the Soviet Union will deal with the west on any reasonable terms in the foreseeable future. The salvation of the west depends on the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in western Europe backed by the United States and the Dominions—such a mobilization of moral and material force as will inspire confidence and energy within and respect elsewhere."[7]

Marshall considered this statement of sufficient importance to send an assistant, John D. Hickerson, to the Foreign Office to find out precisely what Bevin had in mind. A Foreign Office official explained that Bevin contemplated, more specifically, *two* security arrangements: one, "a small tight circle including a treaty engagement between the U.K., the Benelux countries and France," and, surrounding that, "a larger circle with somewhat lesser commitments but still commitments in treaty form bringing in rhe U.S. and Canada also."[8] Note that the "union" (the "small tight circle") was to be entirely, and presumably exclusively, European. The role projecred for the United States and Canada, and perhaps other Dominions, was that of backing up a European effort, a strictly external relationship.

This suggestion of Bevin, followed by his historic speech in the House of Commons on 22 January 1948, appears to have been largely his own initiative. His thinking was probably influenced, however, by various comparable ideas for dealing with the Soviet Union that had earlier been floated.[9] One was the proposal by Winston Churchill in March 1946 at Fulton, Missouri—part

of the famous Iron Curtain speech—of a "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples." Such a grouping, a *de facto* Anglo-American alliance, would have involved "joint use of all naval and air force bases" and, eventually, "common citizenship." Another precedent, less dramatically presented but perhaps more achievable, was the recommendation by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Louis S. St. Laurent, at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1947 that there be "an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations [than those under the U.N. Charter] in return for a greater measure of national security." This was a proposal to supplement the collective security machinery of the United Nations, whose workings were increasingly blocked by the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto in the Security Council. St. Laurent, like many internationalists in the United States, was not ready to surrender the hope that the United Nations would become the principal instrument of world pacification. The provisions of the Charter, St. Laurent reminded his audience, are "a floor under" rather than "a ceiling over," the responsibilities of its member states.[10] The firmest support seemed to be Article 51, which declared in part: "Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

Bevin's concept differed from these earlier ideas in important ways. Churchill's advocacy of a seemingly exclusive alliance between the United States and the British Empire had produced a backlash, not only within the heterogeneous American public but also among the world's non-English speaking peoples. St. Laurent's U.N. Charter-based scheme, though less ethnically invidious, was too universalist and lacked flavor.

What Bevin offered was more concrete and arresting than either the Churchill or St. Laurent ideas: the prospect of a permanent British commitment to the Continent of Europe. "For one moment in her political history," later wrote Belgian leader Paul-Henri Spaak, "Britain was enthusiastic and, may I say, lucid, about Europe."[11] In reality, Bevin was clear only about "Western Europe." This was a new entity, a somewhat artificial region defined less by culture or history than by the fact of Soviet military control over the eastern part of Europe. Britain, France, and the Benelux countries would form the nucleus of the grouping. Beyond the "Western Union" core, Bevin mentioned possible inclusion of "the new Italy"—despite the conclusion of an Italian Peace Treaty, still widely viewed with suspicion. More circumspectly still, Bevin also left the way open for eventual participation by Germany. Its assets he privately considered vital to the future strength of the proposed Union.

The model that Bevin and his Foreign Office associates used initially was the 1947 Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk. This, an old-fashioned military alliance, provided for the immediate assistance by Great Britain and France to one another in the event of an attack upon either by Germany. They envisioned a network of such bilateral pacts, progressively tying in France and the Low Countries with other continental countries. By this means, they could acknowledge France's emotionally felt and doctrinaire insecuriry *vis-à-vis* Germany and hope partially to dissipate it. There was no doubt in Bevin's own mind, however, that the principal threat to Europe was not the Soviet one. The Soviet Union had in effect split Europe,

as well as Germany, and Brirain had somehow to act to shield its western half. Bevin did not believe this really could be done without substantial outside help—namely, that of the United States. Yet apart from mentioning in his House of Commons speech that the "resources" of America would be needed, he said nothing. He knew, on the basis of dealing with Americans with regard to the Marshall Plan, that the best way to get U.S. aid was to make a show of not needing it.[12]

Initial U.S. Response. As the above discussion indicates, the impetus for an alliance came from Europe, more particularly from Great Britain. What was the American response to the British suggestions? Secretary Marshall, solid and judicious, was clearly interested but inclined to think a military alliance, beyond practical staff talks, premature.[13] His reserve may have been in part because of his unfavorable judgment of Bevin. For reasons his staff never fully understood, Marshall simply did not like the tough, plain-spoken former union leader. "Ambassador Douglas and all of us did everything we could to promote a beautiful friendship between the two, similar to that that had existed between Byrnes and Bevin and later developed between Acheson and Bevin," recalls one colleague, "but it didn't work." (Bevin greatly admired Marshall.)[14] The most effective way to restore a balance of power in Europe, Marshall and most other American officials believed, was through economic recovery first—that is, through the Marshall Plan (for which Congress had not yet appropriated the funds). His European Recovery Program (ERP) thus had an indirect military purpose. During the voyage home after the London Conference he had discussed the matter with members of his delegation, including the Republican Party's "ambassador," John Foster Dulles. It is possible that Dulles, who had gone to France where he had been shocked by a wave of Communist-inspired strikes against the Marshall Plan, heightened the general's sense of alarm.[15] In any case, Marshall, upon his arrival in the United States, grimly reported over nationwide radio and television that Europe had for practical purposes been separated into an eastern part and a western part and that it was necessary to move ahead with the independent rehabilitation of the latter. "We must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt," he declared. This statement may be taken as the symbolic abandonment by the Truman administration of any realistic hope of early European reunification and, indeed, the end of American "European" policy in the former cosmopolitan sense of that term. Henceforth U.S. official concern was, in Marshall's words, "the rehabilitation of western European civilization with its freedoms."[16]

Marshall's subordinates in the State Department, though intrigued by Bevin's proposal (which they likened to Marshall's initiative at Harvard in June 1947), had reservations about its specific character. The idea of concluding further treaties like the bilateral Dunkirk Treaty, explicitly directed against Germany, was considered by most of them narrow-minded and backward-looking. To the extent that a Western Union would reflect this same purpose, rather than opposition to the threat of Soviet domination in Europe, it would be beside the point. To meet the newer and broader Soviet danger, they believed, a multilateral alliance of European states would be the appropriate form of cooperation. This would have the further advantage of encouraging, as did the Marshall Plan, European interest in forming a United States-like federated Europe. The result would really be something solid and progressive,

something the American people, fascinated with blueprints like the Federal Union scheme, could support with enthusiasm.

The specific model American officials urged upon Western European leaders was the recently concluded Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Rio de Janeiro Treaty. As one participant remembers, "The Rio pattern was favored because it: (1) provided for an appropriate collective defense arrangement under the U.N. Charter, and (2) had recently been approved by the U.S. Senate." There was a further technical point that a few officials considered as well. Because threats to the peace of Latin America had historically come nor only from outside the hemisphere hut from inside it, as in the case of the Paraguayan-Bolivian Chaco War (1932-1935), the text of the Rio Pact had heen drafted so as to encompass action against aggression from within the alliance itself. The 21 parties simply stated, without specifying the source, that "an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all." This became known, somewhat misleadingly, as the "Monroe Doctrine formula"—erroneous because the Monroe Doctrine was not, like the Musketeers' pledge, a reciprocal commitment but rather a unilateral declaration. Its attraction in the context of discussion of the Western Union was that Germany could ultimately be included as an ally without depriving the French of the protection they felt they needed against it. With this theoretical assurance of an *internal* balance, the Union could in fact be developed as a counterweight against Russia in an *external* balance.[17] Yet, as an ostensibly self-contained "regional defense system" rather than a formation against the Soviet Union, such a grouping need not be provocative. In other words, rhe Rio pattern would be used as a "screen." As Hickerson explained to the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, a European defense system conceived in terms of the Inter-American Treaty

> would not seem specifically directed against the Soviets and might make it easier of acceptance by states whose geographical position rendered them more vulnerable to Soviet pressure, such as Sweden. Conceived in these terms it would he even possible for the Soviet Union to join the arrangement without detracting from the protection which it would give to its other members.[18]

The Rio Pact example, being an American conception, clearly implied some involvement on the part of the United States. On the nature of this relationship there emerged a split in upper State Department ranks. Certain officials, notahly Hickerson, the Director of the Office of European Affairs, and his suhordinate in charge of Western European affairs, Theodore C. Achilles, believed that even a multilateralized British-French-Benelux agreement would be inadequate unless the United States formally adhered to it. If such a transatlantic pact were, like the Rio Treaty, "clearly linked up" with the United Nations, Hickerson advised Secretary Marshall, the country could and should go along with it.[19] Arrayed against Hickerson and Achilles were two even higher-ranking Department officers: the cerebral Director of the Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan, and the Department's diplomatically experienced Counselor, Charles E. Bohlen. Both men considered America's formal participation in European alliance-making unnecessary and European anxieties, as Kennan later described them, "a little silly." As Kennan and Bohlen, close friends, happened to be the government's top Soviet experts, their assessment that the Soviet menace did not require such involvement by the United States could

not be dismissed lightly. Communist protests in Europe against America's initial success with the Marshall Plan merely seemed evidence to them that "some conciliatory gesture" was needed—a sign making it clear that "our purpose was not to humiliate the Soviet Government."[20] Particularly in Kennan's case it was not primarily a judgment about Russia but rather a belief about Europe that governed his response to Bevin's proposal. Kennan's personal European policy was embodied in the Marshall Plan, which, because Congress had not yet made the main authorization for it, was still his preoccupation. The European Recovery Program was built on the principles of economic restoration first and European self-help. "Military union should not be the starting point. It should flow from the political, economic, and spiritual union—not vice versa," he argued in a memorandum to Marshall. To introduce "the note of military defense" right at the outset might frighten some of the outlying countries, notably the Scandinavian states. Bevin's subordinates, he feared, were thinking of "just another 'framework' of military alliances." This would be of little value. "If there is to be 'union,' it must have some reality in economic and technical administrative arrangements; and there must be some real federal authority." American participation in these European deliberations, Kennan believed, would not be appropriate. He did not rule out, however, some reassurance to the Europeans to continue what they were doing by way of organizing themselves.

> People in Europe should not bother their heads too much in the initial stage about our relationship to this concept; if they develop it and make it work, there will be no real question as to our long-term relationship to it, even with respect to the military guarantee. This will flow logically from the circumstances.[21]

Leaders in Western Europe were not so complacent. Their dilemma, as expressed by Lord Inverchapel, was this: If the United States did not give an actual pledge of support to Bevin's Western Union project, Bevin might not be able to make it "a going concern," for it would be perceived as having too little substance behind it. Unless and until the Western Union were successfully established, however, the U.S. Government did not seem to feel it could not discuss participation in it. Bevin feared "getting into a vicious circle."[22]

The March Crises. This circle was broken in early 1948 by a series of events as alarming as any that had occurred since the end of the war. These, and similar occurrences later, accelerated processes that would otherwise have taken months to develop, if they would have developed at all. On 25 February the Soviet-backed Communist Party in Czechoslovakia overturned the government there and installed a puppet regime. Shortly thereafter, the Foreign Minister, the beloved Jan Masaryk, jumped—or was thrown—from a window in the Foreign Office to his death on the cement courtyard below.[23] The effect of the Prague *coup* was, as Bevin's assistant, Gladwyn Jebb, recollected the widespread feelings, "electrical." If the Russians could do this to one European democracy, nearly 3 years after the war was over, what was to stop them from doing it to others? Certainly little in the way of armed strength, it seemed.[24]

One should realize that Czechoslovakia itself had been at the mercy of Soviet military power ever since the liberation of that country by Soviet troops in 1945. Western forces in Germany consisted of fewer than 200,000 poorly organized troops: in the north, two British divisions, equipped

with wartime *Churchill* tanks; in the center, three very weak French divisions, armed with old *Sherman* tanks bought from Belgian junk dealers; and, in the south, the equivalent of two American divisions, deployed and trained to police Germans rather rhan fight Russians. Ground troop reserves and tactical air support units added little to the total. Opposite the Western forces, distributed for occupation purposes as well as for defensive purposes, there were nearly 30 Soviet divisions, amounting to well over half a million men. Altogether, Soviet fighting mass in Europe outweighed that of the West by more than three to one. "All the Russians need to get to the Channel," quipped Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, "is shoes."[25] The takeover of Czechoslovakia seemed to mark a new phase in Soviet-Western relations in which this military balance would be directly relevant. It suggests that Stalin had decided to sacrifice what little comity was left in the wartime alliance and to use all means necessary, including subversion backed by physical force, to secure the Soviet sphere.

At about the same time there occurred another incident which, though less dramatic (and, in a sense, artificial), had an important effect on American military policy and preparations. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. Military Governor in Germany, on 5 March sent a cable to Washington in which he ominously stated: "For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness."[26] Although the chief purpose of this telegram (not sent through normal command channels) may have been to help the military chiefs scare Congress into funding the defense programs they urgently wanted, the content of the message was such as to make any reader doubt that it could have been sent irresponsihly. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was impressed enough to copy the top-secret message in his diary. He no doubt also saw that it was brought to the attention of President Truman. This telegram may have played a role in getting the Senate Armed Services Committee to proceed with hearings on Universal Military Training (UMT). Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Japan, like Clay himself in Germany, received an order "to survey carefully your emergency plans." Perhaps the best indication of the fear that was felt is that the Central Intelligence Agency felt called upon to give its estimate (16 March) that war was "not probahle within sixty days." George Kennan, who was sent Clay's message while on a tour of the Far East, believes that it had an even deeper effect upon American official opinion than word of the Czech *coup*, and that the combined influence in Washington of these reports was a "real war scare."[27]

Later in March there was a further disturbing episode in (real or imagined) East-West relations that, though not widely discussed then and almost completely forgotten today, was of even greater importance than the Czech *coup* or sensed threat in Germany in promoting the formation of an Atlantic, as distinct from a mere Western European or narrowly focused United States-Western European, military coalition. This was the stir in diplomatic circles caused by an anticipated Soviet note to Norway demanding Norway's signature of a Soviet-Norwegian nonaggression pact, possibly involving Soviet right of access under certain circumstances to Norway's long coastline. A signatory of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Soviet Union already had a stake in Spitzbergen. Simultaneously, the Russians were concluding a one-sided security arrangement with Finland. A letter from Stalin to

President Paasikivi had produced a crisis. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, asked his Ambassador in Moscow to find out if the Russians would approach Norway next. The Soviet Union had *always* wanted a nonaggression pact with Norway, came the possibly misunderstood reply.[28] To the British Govetnment Soviet pressure on Norway had special significance. Britain could not (as the Second World War had proved) hold a position in Norway; and, if it did not do so, any Western Union alliance it might form could be outflanked. The "defection" of Norway, Bevin warned Washington and Ottawa, "would involve the appearance of Russia on the Atlantic and the collapse of the whole Scandinavian system. This would in turn prejudice the chance of calling any halt to the relentless advance of Russia into Western Europe." In light of this danger, Bevin proposed very early steps by Britain, the United States, and Canada "before Norway goes under" to conclude a regional "Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance." Within the scope of such an "Atlantic security system" would be included all the countries directly threatened by a Soviet breakout into the Atlantic. Besides Norway itself and Britain (together with the United States and Canada), potential members might include Denmark, Iceland, Eire, France, Portugal, and, "when it has a democratic regime," Spain.[29]

At the same time as North Sea-North Atlantic waters were being ruffled, the Mediterranean—a special area of concern for the United States after the Greek and Turkish troubles and the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine—threatened to grow agitated again. For officials in Washington the separate developments on the European central front and the northern and southern flanks were interrelated, psychologically if not geostrategically. Their apprehensions focused on the forthcoming Italian elections scheduled for 18 April. Hickerson advised Marshall:

> The easy success of the Communists in Czechoslovakia and the probable outcome of the Finnish crisis, while opening some eyes to the dangers of any dealings with the Communists, have created widespread fear and a certain bandwagon psychology, particularly in the crucial non-Communist left. Italy, with its impending elections, is the critical spot at the moment, but French stability is far from assured and the country is now in a highly nervous state. The same is true of Austria. A general stiffening of morale in free Europe is needed, and it can only come from action by this country.[30]

George Kennan, who had been disturbed by Clay's telegram and out of touch with current intelligence or reassuring Department advice, was surprisingly even more interventionist. If the Communists were to win through intimidation in Italy, he cabled Marshall from Manila, "our whole position in the Mediterranean, and possibly in western Europe as well, would probably be undermined." He frankly wondered whether it would not be "better that elections not take place at all than that Communists win in these circumstances." His practical suggestion was that the Italian Government "outlaw" the Communist Party and "take strong action" against it before any elections could be held. This was followed by an (even by the hard-boiled standards of the time) astonishing scenario:

> Communists would presumably reply with civil war, which would give us grounds for reoccupation [of] Foggia fields or any other facilities we might wish. This would admittedly result in much violence and probably a military division of Italy; but we are getting close to the deadline and I think it might well be preferable to a

> bloodless election victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.[31]

Kennan's attitude, seemingly at variance with the political and economic emphasis of his Marshall Plan work, sheds interesting light on the meaning of his "containment" concept. He and other American officials in 1948 retained vivid impressions of the geopolitical pattern of the Second World War and were still strongly in the grip of the ethic of that conflict. The barrier behind which Soviet power must be kept was, in his view, not some abstract line but "the high-water mark" of the Soviet military advance at the end of the war.[32] What lay within the Soviet sphere would not be interfered with; but the Soviet Union must not interfere in the Western sphere. Italy was a country in which the Americans and British, not the Russians, had "taken the surrender," and it was not Kennan's view that they had liberated the country from the Nazis only to turn it over within 3 years to another tyranny no less hostile to them than the Hitlerites.

The larger solution to the Italian problem that was most often recommended was a formal system of security for the whole Mediterranean. This, a favorite British notion that was urged upon Washington by Bevin, was conceived of as separate from but complementary to the United Kingdom-France-Benelux system and an Atlantic Approaches Pact.[33] One had to start somewhere. The Western Union concept was the furthest along and received the most emphasis.

Treaty of Brussels. The multiple Crisis of March—Czechoslovakia, Germany, Norway, Italy, and tension in some other spots—convinced Bevin to complete his Western Union project. He took the "gamble" that the United States, though not prepared to lead, would eventually follow along.[34] Shortly after the Prague *coup*, discussions toward that end opened in Brussels. The French Government was so affected by the *grande peur* that seized Europe that it indicated its readiness to consider a multilateral treaty, rather than a set of bilateral pacts, and to fight against any aggressor, not only Germany. The result was the 50-year Treaty of Brussels signed on 17 March 1948. It was an amalgam of the Dunkirk and Rio Treaties, referring as it did both to the possibility of renewed German aggression and to "individual and collective self-defense" under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Thus it could be used against the Soviet Union.

The negotiations in Brussels were followed by American officials with rapt attention. Having advised the participants on the merits of the Rio Treaty, they were interested to see what would happen. The very day the Brussels Treaty was signed (St. Patrick's Day), President Truman spoke to a joint session of Congress on the menace of communism to Europe. His practical interests were authorizations for the European Recovery Program, the adoption of UMT, and the restoration of Selective Service. He also strongly implied a prospective American stake in the Western Union. Referring to the new agreement simultaneously being concluded in Brussels, he said: "It is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization. This development deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires."[35]

What American "support" did Truman have in mind? At a minimum, it would seem, he meant shipments of military equipment and, at the maximum, perhaps some form of actual U.S. association with the European

effort. His and others' controlling concern, however, was the feeling that the U.S. Government should wait to see whether the Brussels powers could effectively implement their agreement.[36]

Gaining American Commitment. Association by the United States with Europe was less likely to develop through the Brussels Union, however, than through the secret tripartite British-American-Canadian talks that began in Washington 5 days later. The reason was that these discussions, an outgrowth of Bevin's "larger circle" suggestion, were specifically aimed at a problem of *direct* concern to the United States: the security of the North Atlantic.

It should be noted that the participants in the Washington intergovernmental talks—the principal representatives being U.S. Under Secretary of State Lovett, assisted (significantly) by Hickerson and Achilles, British Under Secretary Gladwyn Jebb, and Canadian External Affairs Deputy Minister Lester B. Pearson—were not thinking only in Atlantic terms.[37] Some hoped that a treaty arrangement among them would be but the first in a series of security arrangements, regional in character, that might ultimately be fused into a worldwide "regional" pact. Bevin cabled from London:

> A real defence system worked out by the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Western European States would affect the whole approach of the world to the peace problem and be the first great step towards what could ultimately become a real world collective Security System, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.[38]

The immediate requirement, however, was construction of a North Atlantic defense system. How should the system be organized? The simplest answer was for the United States and Canada to adhere formally to the Brussels Pact. There seemed compelling reasons against doing so, however. The obligations under the Brussels Treaty (Article IV) were "automatic" ones. If any of the high contracting parties were attacked, the others were obliged to afford it "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." By contrast, the U.S. Senate, seeking to preserve America's freedom of action, had insisted during the Rio Treaty negotiations upon a provision respecting "constitutional processes." It presumably would do so again.[39] Another objection to joining the Brussels Union, stressed by Hickerson (who apparently did not appreciate the extent to which it might count against an Atlantic-wide pact as well) was that any American participation in European institutions would weaken them as instruments of European unification—a declared American policy goal. As he expressed the point: "the U.S. hopes to see the eventual development of a United States of Western Europe (possibly later of all Europe) and the Brussels Pact offers the hard core for such a development. It would lose its utility for this purpose were the U.S. to join."[40]

A second deceptively simple solution to the problem of America's transatlantic commitment, favored by believers in European autonomy (like Kennan) as well as by some American sovereignty-conscious thinkers (like Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio), was a unilateral Presidential, or Presidential-Congressional, declaration. This would be akin to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and the 1947 Truman Doctrine. Such a declaration or resolution would be to the effect that the United States of America would regard any threat to the free countries of Europe (or some broader area) as a threat to its own national security, and act accordingly. While a unilaterally given guarantee might

satisfy in the short run, it was objected, it could not be a long-term solution. This was not simply because a future American President might disregard a predecessor's commitment—a distinct possibility, feared the European negotiators. It was rather that, given the nature of American public opinion, a one-sided or asymmetrical arrangement might become politically untenable. It was said that "sooner or later the U.S. would have to require reciprocal guarantees from others. Were reciprocal guarantees offered, the result would, in effect, be a mutual defense agreement."[41]

The recipients of free security might become as unhappy as the donors. A unilateral guarantee by the United States might accentuate the European countries' "satellite" character—a charge already being leveled against them by the political Left for depending so heavily on Marshall Plan aid. Moreover, as the Canadian Government emphasized, an American declaration would be only a pledge of *military* support, whereas a general multilateral accord—in which Canada would not just be the North American junior partner—could contain significant provisions for political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Within a "community," all would be equal.[42]

For American officials, perhaps the most important consideration against both the Brussels Union and a unilateral declaration was the Pentagon's desire for overseas naval and airbases. One must remember how fresh soldiers' memories of the Second World War were. In a sense, the U.S. military, and Congressmen too, simply wanted the right again to use the bases American Seabees had built and American taxpayers had already paid for. On a more rational strategic level, Defense planners were calculating that war against the Russians should be fought in much the way war against the Germans, Italians, and Japanese had been fought: as far away from the continental United States as possible.[43]

The British, who themselves still had military problems abroad (e.g., Malaya and Palestine), well understood American sentimental and global strategic requirements. They themselves had many of the desirable basing facilities. They could not simply *give* these to the Americans, however. There would need to be, at a minimum, a formal exchange or bargain of some kind—of more lasting advantage to Britain than the 1940 destroyer bases deal now seemed to have been.[44] A mere statement by the President, especially if not endorsed by the Senate, Bevin explained in a cable, would make people in Britain

> very doubtful as to whether they had incurred any reciprocal obligation. We should certainly be under a moral obligation not to leave the United States in the lurch. We should be consrantly challenged as to whether we were in any way bound by a presidential declaration, and we should have to say that there was no commitment. That would leave us in a very unsatisfactory position and might arouse resentment in America.[45]

A Transatlantic Treaty. Given rhe force of the arguments against American membership in rhe Brussels Union and an unreciprocated pledge of support for Western Europe, the conferees in the intergovernmental talks reached the common conclusion that a formal Atlantic-wide treaty relationship of some sort would be necessary. But how, in a Presidential election year, could a Republic-controlled Congress and a domestically minded American people be persuaded of this necessity?

Cririca1 support came from the Chairman of the Senare Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan. Though a

Republican with an impeccable isolationist past, he had undergone a "conversion" and had been of immense help to the Truman administration in securing passage of the European Recovery Program, the Inter-American Treaty, and other internationalist measures. The State Department's Lovett ("a seasoned financier and a very smooth, capable operator"), in particular, enjoyed almost fraternal relations with him. Vandenberg was also influenced by Republican lawyer John Foster Dulles. Initially cool to the idea of a defense treaty, favoring instead an effort to strengthen the faltering United Nations Organization, the Senator was coached into sponsoring a resolution permitting "association" by the United States with Europe. He quickly developed a proprietary interest in the project. "Why should a Democratic President get all the kudos in an election year?" he reasonably asked. "Wouldn't the chances of Senate 'consent' to ratification of such a treaty be greatly increased by Senatorial 'advice' to the President to negotiate it?"[46] His partisanship and statesmanship merged.

The Vandenberg Resolution (S.R. 329) passed the Senate on 11 June 1948 by a bipartisan vote of 64 to 4. Article 3, one of the key provisions of that resolve, envisioned: "Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements [a Rio Treaty formula] as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid [Marshall Plan language], and as affect its national security."[47]

The carefully, if vaguely, worded S.R. 329 was not by itself a sufficient factor to bring the United States into an alliance with the countries of Western Europe. It was more of a permissive condition than a productive one, although the *advice* given was a generative impulse. What mainly drove the transatlantic talks forward at this stage was another dramatic world event: the imposition by the Soviet Union on 24 June 1948 of a full blockade on Western land and rail communications with Berlin. A blockade, General Clay assumed, was the dire activity he had sensed in his alarmist 5 March message. He wrote in his memoirs: "I was convinced that this was the action I had anticipated and that military action was not likely. I reported these views promptly to the Department of the Army, even though the instance and events could have created war if they had been permitted to do so."[48]

The West's nonmilitary response was the Berlin airlift. The soul-lifting "bridge of planes" to the imprisoned city had a powerful effect on American thinking, especially. Britain's Prime Minister Clement Attlee later commented that, "although Greece and the Soviet *coup* in Czechoslovakia opened the eyes of Congress quite a lot, it wasn't, I think, until the Berlin airlift that American public opinion really wakened up to the facts of life. Their own troops were involved in that, you see."[49]

Even this was not enough. When in July the "Washington Exploratory Talks on Security" (now including French, Belgian, and Dutch representatives) resumed, they proceeded at a snail's pace, the cause not merely the inherent complexity of the issues. Achilles explains: "The process was a deliberately leisurely one since the U.S. team made clear the importance it attached to avoiding public controversy until after the Presidential election in early November."[50] The foreign participants were probably not difficult to persuade of the wisdom in this. Most expected a change of government.

Truman's "upset" of Thomas E. Dewey on 2 November 1948 opened a new, more public phase of negotiations. From now on the Senate would be directly involved. Hickerson and Achilles met regularly with members of

the Foreign Relations Committee, and even more often with its chief of staff, Dr. Francis O. Wilcox.[51] The chief negotiator for the Executive Branch, Lovett, now turned over his brief to Dean Acheson, President Truman's choice to succeed General Marshall as Secretary of State. Although a former State Department official, Acheson had been in private law practice and needed to be brought up to date. He was thus not, despite the title of his memoirs, "present at the creation" of NATO—the institution with which his name is historically most closely associated. "He was," a senior Canadian official has quipped, "present only on the sixth, the last day of the creation, but that was a particularly busy day."[52]

Acheson's was a virtuoso performance. "I was like a circus performer riding two horses," he recalled. His trick was to keep the intergovernmental discussions and the congressional deliberations moving in parallel. He masterfully used the Ambassadors' desire for American engagement to "urge on" the Senators, and used the Senators' fear of European entanglement to "hold back" the Ambassadors.[53] The result was steady progress.

The Issues. The main issues before both groups, as Acheson saw them, were three: First, should the treaty deal with more than military security? Second, what nations should become signatories of it? And third, what specific commitments should it contain?

The first issue—whether an Atlantic arrangement should be a military coalition or a total community—was pressed most forcefully by some (not all) Canadian officials. Their submission was Article 2 dealing with international general welfare. Having relatively little to contribute in the way of manpower or equipment, particularly after Europe was rearmed, the Canadian representatives—notably Pearson—urged that any alliance must have political, economic, and social meaning. It should also have a transcendent spiritual character. It must, they argued, be positive and dynamic, not negative and static. While undoubtedly expressing genuine idealism, the Canadian case was based as well on more realistic considerations. Pearson's second in command, Escott Reid, has since declared frankly that "the farther the North Atlantic community moved towards political and economic union the more the power of the United States would be restrained by the influence of the North Atlantic allies, especially Britain and France." A transatlantic alliance would "contain" the United States—as well as the Soviet Union. It would give Canada "a countervailing force" against its large neighbor. Recalling and reversing Canada's dictum, Reid fancied calling in Britain and Western Europe "to restore the balance of North America."[54] (This logic explains why the Canadians have never liked the "dumb-bell" idea for organizing transatlantic relations—i.e., the notion of a consolidated North America and Western Europe working as equal partners.)

Lovett, Hickerson, Kennan, and perhaps some other State Department officials had seemed to the Canadians to be responsive to their appeal. Even Senator Vandenberg was evidently enthusiastic. "Unless the Treaty becomes far more than a purely military alliance," he astutely remarked, "it will be at the mercy of the first plausible Soviet peace offensive."[55]

Secretary Acheson, however, was cold to the Canadian plans. To his incisive mind Pearson's case seemed woolly. Acheson's lack of response may have owed something as well to his Canadian parentage and resultant familiarity with the issues of Canadian politics. He may have perceived in Ottawa's idealism a desire to guarantee an international market for the prairie provinces' wheat

and to placate anticonscriptionists in Quebec and in the religious communities out west. A relatively conservative Democrat, Acheson may also have disliked the implication in Article 2 of a globalized New Deal. (He had resigned from the Treasury Department in the 1930s because of a difference of principle with President Roosevelt.)

On what appear to be rather slender, personal grounds he became convinced that the Senare would never approve the kind of humanitarian alliance the Canadians wanted. "We had all just been through a punishing experience," he recalls in his memoirs. In trying to persuade the Foreign Relations Committee to accept a set of agreements his predecessor had brought back ftom a meeting in Bogota, he had taken "a terrible beating." The agreements, as he described them, "announced sweeping alleged human tights to education, the good life, welfare, and so on, reminiscent of a good many U.N. resolutions." "Evetyone was going to have a college education." "Women were going to have the same tights as men." There was a further considetation. Senator Walter Geotge (D., Geotgia) and others, especially fellow Southern legislators, perceived in the attempts by the United Nations to deal with such matters "serious constitutional complications in federal-state-relationships." In at least some part, for some members, this was a constitutionalist mask for anxiety lest the Truman administration use international commitments to enforce libetal domestic civil rights policies that neither Congress nor many srate legislatures would pass. (This argument was carried further in the early 1950s by the Bricker Amendment movement.) The proposed Article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty rext touched the same nerve as these earlier measures. Acheson hardly needed to express any legal reservations he himself may have had, for Senator Tom Connally (D., Texas), who after the election became Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, declared: "The reference to the general welfare in the Unired States Constitution has caused more litigation than any other provision in it. Get it the hell out of this treaty."[56]

Acheson concurred with most of the Senators' judgment that to provide for Atlantic welfare in a military alliance would he to jeopardize it "for no importanr benefit."[57] The European negotiarors agreed as well, especially as the Senate might not go along. Thus Article 2, though too patently well-meaning and too ardently supported by the Canadians to be excised completely, was reduced to an abstract promise to strengthen "free institutions," bring about "better understanding," and promote "conditions of stability and well-being." Only slightly mote concretely, it urged "eliminating conflict" in international economic affairs and "encouraging economic collaboration." Nothing specific was said about lowering tatiffs within an alliance or coordinating defense production—two areas in which practical action was possible then as latet. In Acheson's view, as he expressed it to the Commirtee, Article 2 was the "ethical essence" of the Treaty. It "does not impose any obligations upon the conttacting parties."[58] Although "a reservoir of gteat potential," as Achilles today rightly stresses, Article 2 has during most of its life been programmatically a dead letter. This may be changing.[59]

Acheson's second question—who shoúld sign a treaty—was partially dependent on the answer to the first—that of the alliance's nature. If the alliance were to be strictly a military combination, then geostrategic considerations would largely determine the membership. If it were also to be a political and economic union, rhen ideological considerations would have a major bearing.

For most American officials, despite the role of the United States as the standard bearer of the "Free World," geostrategy clearly came first. The military perspective of Americans was now much broader, more panoramic than it ever had been. Guided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the American negotiators took the position that any transatlantic alliance would require access to the major midocean islands. This was the "stepping stones" concept. "In those days of comparatively short-range aircraft," Achilles recalls, "it was considered that U.S. reinforcement of its European allies in the event of war would require refueling facilities in Greenland (i.e., Danish adherence), Iceland, and the Azores. This indicated the importance of Portuguese membership...."[60] Norway's participation would help secure the Northern flank. The value of including these outposts also partly lay in denying them to the enemy which could interfere, as during the war, with cross-Atlantic shipping. But now there was an awareness of something new: the vulnerability of North America itself. Because of potential technical developments in aviation, the United States and Canada had "live" frontiers. They had to be concerned not simply with backing up European defenses but with buttressing their own, in the Arctic as well as in the Atlantic. Lovett had bluntly stated early in the intergovernmental talks that "Greenland and Iceland were more important than some nations in Western Europe to the security of the United States and Canada."[61]

The French, by contrast, wanted to concentrate the focus on the central front in Germany in accord with the new doctrine (not easily reconcilable with their wish to keep the Germans forever disarmed) of "forward defense."[62] They were also keenly interested in the Mediterranean, both its northern and southern shores. During the war North Africa had been a vital refuge for them and they feared it might be so again. Taking up an initial American suggestion that Italy—a "Western" if not an "Atlantic" country—be included in a pact, the French argued that if this were done Algeria ("in the same relation to France as Alaska or Florida to the United States"), should be covered as well. At one point France's Ambassador in Washington, Henri Bonnet, infuriated his diplomatic colleagues and Acheson by stating, in a virtual ultimatum, that his government would not approve an invitation to Norway unless one also were sent to Italy. Such linkage, Acheson objected, would be ruinous. "Bonnet's clumsy advocacy came near to defeating his purpose," he later wrote. Nonetheless, the French strategy in the end worked. Other than Hickerson, few administration officials or Congressmen were enthusiastic about Italian membership, which seemed geographically odd to them. Had Acheson not replaced Lovett in the negotiations, Hickerson has speculated, the French gambit would have failed. It was decided to invite both Norway and Italy and also to extend the coverage of the treaty to Algeria. In the Atlantic Ocean itself, the southern boundary of the alliance domain would be the Tropic of Cancer. This had the effect of precluding adherence by African states and American Republics (e.g., Cuba, Mexico).[63]

Widening the Alliance. These were consequential decisions. Norway's joining the negotiations, in the person of its Atlantic-oriented Lange, meant the defeat of a Swedish plan for a Nordic Defense Pact—a kind of latter-day League of Armed Neutrality. The decision to invite Italy meant that a separate Mediterranean-wide defense system, including Greece, Turkey, perhaps Egypt and possibly Iran, would be unlikely. Although Italy's inclusion in the transatlantic orbit seemed at first

glance to violate the "natural" geographic basis of a North Atlantic Pact, it had the subtle effect of extending the Atlantic concept itself, transforming at least the western part of the Mediterranean into an "arm" of the Atlantic. For Americans, who preferred to contribute naval power rather than ground troops to Europe's defense, this was important. "I don't know what we would do with the Sixth Fleet if Italy hadn't been included," Hickerson later admitted.[64]

The geographical stretching of the Atlantic Alliance had important ideological implications. Scandinavian socialism was muted by Norway's, Denmark's, and Iceland's dependence upon free-enterprise America for future military supplies and protection. It was made clear that such aid would *not* be forthcoming if the Scandinavian states remained neutral. Italy, though still regarded by some as a former enemy state, received supplies and firm "democratic" backing (though not in the extreme form Kennan had proposed) in order to prevent it from going communist. In the event, Alcide de Gasperi's Christian Democratic-led coalition had been returned to power easily. The adherence of Italy to the Alliance hastened the liquidation of the Second World War, but it also further crystallized the pattern of the cold war. Portugal, with its authoritarian Salazar regime, gave the alliance a slight fascist tinge. (This would have been even blacker if, as some American military planners urged, Franco Spain had been included.) The incorporation of non-Western, quasi-colonial Algeria reminded the world that many of the North Atlantic partners, despite the inevitability of decolonization, were still "empires." Eire's refusal to join as long as the problem of Northern Ireland remained unsettled made a similar point.

Partly in order to preserve the ideological purity of the Alliance while securing wide geostrategic advantages, some U.S. officials, one of them Kennan, had reasoned that there might be "gradations in membership" This led to the suggestion, never taken very seriously, of three membership categories—"resident members, non-resident members, and summer privileges," Lovett wryly commented. That is, apart from the original Allies, having fully mutual obligations, there would be a second group of "associate" members linked to the core partners by limited, asymmetrical, and probably only military relations. This would have well suited the case of Portugal, for only base rights were really sought from it. Neutralist Sweden might also have been extended one-way aid and protection in return for its partial cooperation. The third, more peripheral category would have reached far out onto the globe, perhaps allowing some protection even for Europe's colonies as they progressively became independent. American anticolonial sentiment was a heavy brake on such thinking, of course. The Dutch Government, for example, was once warned that it would not get any military aid under the North Atlantic Treaty unless it had resolved its relationship with Indonesia. Such threats were not realistic enough to be entirely credible, for the United States would do what it had to do in order to defend its friends. The decisive argument against a classification system may have been, as voiced by Lester Pearson, "Why should anyone take on the commitments when they can get all the benefits."[65] Surely an equally powerful consideration was the *amour propre* of the smaller countries themselves. One British diplomat, who does not recall any discussion of three classes of membership, judges the idea a "non-starter" ("it was hard enough to get the smaller countries to accept the tripartite Standing Group"—a body dissolved in 1966). Nonetheless, had such concentric rings of decision and

liability been deemed possible, the present-day, somewhat artificial separation of NATO members' Atlantic and non-Atlantic roles and the absence of Alliance ties with much of the Third World might to a degree have heen avoided. In strictly and narrowly conceiving their membership—in the interest of speed, unity, and secrecy of action—the partners may have lost a future chance for a flexible, worldwide security grouping having a North-South dimension.

Strength of Commitment. Acheson's third issue—the exact commitment under a treaty—was at the time the most difficulr if not, in the long run, perhaps the most significant. This was the issue of "the pledge" (the Americans disliked the European word, "*garantie*"). A formula had to be found that would do two things: on the one hand, appear to satisfy Europeans that the United States would promptly come to their aid, and, on the other hand, seem to assure Congress and the American public that the United States would not be dragged, willy-nilly, into war. I use the words "appear" and "seem" because officials' private conceptions of what really was likely to happen in the event of a military showdown over, say, Berlin made any verbal pledge almost superfluous. They prided themselves on being able to say that the treaty would oblige them to do nothing more than what was already clearly in the American national self-interest. European suggestions that the United States was unreliable filled American officials with indignation. "Did they suppose we had labored to free Europe from the clutches of Hitler merely to abandon it to those of Stalin?" George Kennan wondered.[66]

Why then, the assumption that there had to be a formal, multilateral treaty? The answer can be found partly in the emerging theory of peace through "deterrence." As Dean Acheson notes in his memoirs, "All joined in the doubtful dogma that in two world wars Germany had picked off her victims one by one and that if her rulers had known from the start that such conduct would have brought in Britain and America (presumably at the start) neither war would have occurred." The difficulty in devising a treaty according to this theory was that, "when one took pencil to draft, one was immediately reminded that 'clear as day' must not mean 'automaric commitment.'"[67]

Of all the prospective allies, it was the French who were the most insistent on a *legal* commitment—one as close to the wording of the "automatic" Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties as possible. In 1919 Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson had signed a tripartite defensive alliance that would have given France immediate military assistance in the event of another onslaught by Germany. The U.S. Senate had never acted upon the pact. In 1946 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes had proposed a comparable Four-Power Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany. When the Soviet attitude made cooperation on German matters impossible, the United States had dropped the scheme (which the French liked), refusing even to consider a truncated, three-power version of it. The objection was that only the western part of Germany would thereby be bound, rhe eastern zone being left for the Russians freely to rearm.[68] Not surprisingly, the French wanted, at last, an irrevocable American *engagement*.

The idea of formalizing the transatlanric relationship also had appeal for some Americans. It is important in considering the genesis of the NATO alliance to understand why. Apart from allegedly being given to "arid legalism" in their statesmanship

(a characteristic Kennan has often decried), many American leaders appear to have believed, perhaps without fully admitting it to themselves, that the more "resonant and rotund" the pledge, the less likely it would ever be that the United States would need to act upon it.[69] That is, promise would become a substitute for performance, "deterrence" for "defense."

This tendency of thought became evident during the deliberations over Article 3 of the draft rreaty. The chief purpose of this provision, for the American side, was to spur Europe's *own* common defense efforts, particularly organizational efforts. "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty," it stated, "the Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Did this mean that the United Srates could get by with a verbal pledge, or that it would be obliged to provide actual military assisrance to Europeans—a costly "military ERP"? Senator Vandenberg was emphatic in the negative:

> I think a man can vote for this treaty and not vote for a nickel to implement it, because so far as I am concerned, the opening sentence of the treaty is a notification to Mr. Stalin which puts him in exactly the contrary position to that which Mr. Hitler was in, because Mr. Hitler saw us with a Neutrality Act. Mr. Stalin now sees us with a pact of cooperative action.

For Vandenberg the treaty, because of its presumed deterrent value, would be "an insurance policy"—one that could cost, and would perhaps pay out, nothing.[70]

Another evidence of the reliance upon the new psychologic of deterrence was the seeming amorphousness of American military strategy. Defense Department planners did not want to be pinned down to actual steps the United States would take in the event of war. This was particularly so with regard to the European continent. Given the possibility of having to meet the Soviet Union in notthern Norway or at the Turkish Straits, not to mention North America or the Far East, they scrupulously guarded their liberty to use their scarce resources in accord with their own priorities—to *select* among fronts. Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, the able and articulate represenrative of the Joint Chiefs in the intergovernmental talks, stressed the "necessity for being entirely clear that no commitment to aid a state, victim of attack, should require that aid should be delivered *locally.* We should retain freedom to carry out action againsr rhe aggressor in accordance with srraregic concepts."[71]

Officials in the Pentagon were well aware of how militarily weak Western Europe was. Nominally, its defense was the responsibility of a new Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee (UNIFORCE), headed by Britain's Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery. As one Dutch official remembered, "Our great generals, such as Montgomery and de Lattre de Tassigny, were very nearly our only concrere assets. We had neither the manpower, rhe equipmenr, nor the economic resources to enable them to build up our forces." A probably apocryphal slogan about the European nations' short-term emergency plan was, "On to Lamballe,"—an obscure Brittany village on one of the evacuation routes.[72] Because of this the Brussels partners wanted a large and conrinuous American presence on the continent. They did not want a repetition of the World War II experience, with the Americans arriving only in the last year of a 6-year war. Nor did they want atomic deliverance. If American armies landed in Europe only after world war III began, they would, in the srark phrase of

French leader Henri Queuille, be "liberating a corpse."

U.S. Congressional Opposition. Article 3 appeared, to some European statesmen especially, to be capable of providing U.S. military assistance in advance. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, for example, reported that American aid was one of the *"elements indispensables"* for the effectiveness of the Treaty.[73] The Truman administration itself welcomed the North Atlantic Treaty, once it cleared the Senate, as a policy cover for a large-scale Military Assistance Program (MAP). This it had for some time quietly been preparing in collaboration with European defense officials. It was afraid that major military expenditures by European nations would draw resources away from their recovery efforts.

Whether this military aid program might have won congressional approval without the political justification of the Treaty is difficult to say. The precedents of military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey and, of course, the European Recovery Program itself, suggest that it could have done. Nonetheless, some of the opponents of further American largess were formidable.

Chief among them was "Mr. Republican," Senator Robert A. Taft. To Taft, Article 3 with its implied promise of military aid was more dangerous than any other part of the text, even the "pledge." He saw in it "a peacetime renewal of the old, open-ended lend-lease formula." The Rio Treaty, the presumed model of the North Atlantic Pact, contained no comparable feature. All kinds of circumstances could arise, he warned, in which the obligation to give military aid could prove inconvenient. A recipient government might be taken over by a communist party. Fascist-type governments—Salazar's, and perhaps eventually Franco's too—would be in a position to demand American support. "Obviously, any help we give one of these nations today may be used later for aggressive purposes, against Russia or its satellites, or neutrals, or members of the pact, or it may even be used against us when we try to fulfill our obligation to other members of the pact."[74] Thus a North Atlantic Treaty, of which he deemed the Military Assistance Program an integral part, could lead to an arms race, and war.

Acheson, to his considerable credit, did not shirk the economic-military implications of the draft treaty. While a vote for the alliance would not strictly oblige a vote for the MAP, he told the Senators, it did require their "honest judgment" about the matter. His statement of this concept is well worth quoting:

> The judgment of the executive branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist other countries in the pact to maintain their collective security. The pact does not bind the Congress to reach that same conclusion, for it does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment. It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment. Thus, if you ratify the pact, it cannot be said that there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.

Acheson, later justly proud of the stance he took, commented, "So far as I could prevent it, I would oppose attempting to win votes for the treaty by denigrating its commitments."[75]

The Secretary did, however, gloss over the not-so-hypothetical question of future U.S. direct military involvement in Europe under the Treaty. In a memorable exchange with

Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa, Acheson was asked whether Americans were "going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of these countries' capacity to resist?" "The answer to that question, Senator," he replied, "is a clear and absolute 'No.'" Years later Acheson explained this admittedly "short-range" and "stupid" statement. At the time, he recalled, American troops were regarded as "occupation forces for Germany" and not part of a "defense force for Europe," the latter being the function of Field Marshal Montgomery's Brussels Pact command. All that was being presented in fulfillment of Article 3 was the MAP, "consisting wholly of military hardware."[76]

His explanation is plausible, but neither the whole picture nor entirely realistic. When an eventual peace treaty with Germany was signed in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, American occupation troops would, to be sure, presumably be brought home. That event seemed remote, however, and American forces in Germany were already in effect doing double duty. Acheson's predecessor, General Marshall, had acknowledged this during the Czechoslovak crisis when he cabled Ambassador Lewis Douglas in London:

> As long as European Communism threatens US vital interests and national security we could ill afford to abandon our military position in Germany which can now likewise serve as [a] morale element in a Europe disposed to depression by [the] Czechoslovak submission. The logical conclusion is that three-power occupation may be of unforeseeable and indefinite duration, thus offering protracted security guarantees and establishing a firm community of interests.[77]

Consultation and the "Pledge." Closely related to the problems of America's military contribution under the North Atlantic Treaty was that of interallied "consultation." Two articles of the draft dealt with this. Article 4 required consultation whenever any party felt its "territorial integrity, political independence or security" threatened. An informal "agreed interpretation" made clear that the Article 4 consultation requirement applied to threats "in any part of the world," including threats to the signatories' "overseas territories." Thus, though the defense zone of the treaty was limited to "the North Atlantic area" (defined by Article 6), and there was no provision for aid for the purpose of maintaining colonies, the worldwide scope of the Atlantic powers' interests was recognized. Such farflung places as British Kenya, French Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, or Belgian Congo could under imaginable circumstances be discussed in North Atlantic consultations. So could any remote superpower confrontation that in any way affected the security of the North Atlantic community. Even collective planning, maneuvers, or operations beyond the treaty area were in theory permissible.

Article 9 sketched an organizational framework for consultation. A "Council" would be formed that could "meet promptly at any time." This central body was empowered to create such "subsidiary bodies" as were necessary. In particular, it should "establish immediately a defense committee."[78] Knowing that the United States would probably soon be involved in the work of the Council and an NAT defense body as well, Acheson could hardly have expected that American troops in Germany would remain mere occupation forces or that Montgomery's UNIFORCE would remain in sole military charge in Europe.

The "heart" of the North Atlantic Treaty, to use the standard metaphor, was Article 5. This contained the "pledge,"

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

In its strategic implications Article 5 was closer to the Rio Treaty language than to the Brussels formula, which required immediate military help.[79] The independence of military decision was carefully reserved. This was safeguarded by Article 11, which embodied the Senate's requirement that the Treaty's obligations be carried out in accord with the signatories' "constitutionalized processes." The "assistance" mentioned in Article 5 might include the dispatch of "armed force," but it also could mean less, perhaps not even military help. The parties, it should be noted, were committed to "restore" the security of "the North Atlantic area"—not protect the territory of individual countries in advance from invasion. Thus Article 5, if conservatively analyzed, was not itself a promise of a common, solid forward-defense posture.

In my own view, the main significance of Article 5, apart from its basic legal import, is intellectual and psychological: the recognition, expressed in the phrase taken from the Rio Pact, that "an armed attack against one" of the parties in either Europe or North America would be "an attack against them all." This proposition—whose truth seemed to have been proven by the occurrence of two recent transatlantic wars—was a direct assault on the historic distinction between the Old World and the New World—the idea that, as expressed in Washington's Farewell Address, "Europe has a set of primary interests which ro us have none or very remote relation." To be sure, some Treaty advocates tried to portray this novel American commitment to Europe as simply an eastward extension of the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine—that is, the pressing outward of the boundary of the New World (fused with the Free World) past the vague mid-Atlantic line to the Iron Curtain.[80] Nonetheless, this semantic identification of the Rio Treaty area and the North Atlantic Treaty area did not suppress the widespread feeling of new geographical and political consciousness. The change in the American attitude toward Europe associated with the North Atlantic Treaty has often been called a "revolution."[81] This is justified.

The revolution was an incomplete one, however. Two centuries of tradition could not be so easily overturned. "The illusion that we could live alone behind a barrier of oceans was at last being shed," wrote columnist Marquis Childs. "Yet at the same time the nostalgia for a past that had seemed safe and secure was still strong."[82] In part because of this the Treaty was made collectively reviewable after 10 years (Article 12) and capable of being denounced by any party after 20 years (Article 13). The Senate's approval of the final text on 21 July 1949 by a vote of 82 to 13, with Taft in the minority, was probably a fair measure of this mixture of dominant forward-thinking and recessive backward-thinking.

Implementation. When President Truman, only a few hours after the

Treaty's ratification on 25 July 1949, presented to Congress a request for a $1.4 billion foreign military aid authorization, he quickly learned how incomplete this "revolution" was. Even earlier objections had been voiced when on 5 April, merely 1 day after the NAT signing ceremony in Washington, the State Department revealed that it had received requests for military assistance from the five Brussels Powers and Italy, Denmark, and Norway. Senator Connally had earlier bluntly warned Assistant Secretary of State Ernest A. Gross, "You can't get an arms program until you get this treaty ratified." The abrupt European request threw the North Atlantic Treaty "almost wholly into the climate and atmosphere of arms lend-lease," objected Senator Vandenberg.[83] A large part of the Senators' opposition was simply fiscal conservatism: The European Recovery Program was supposedly already taking care of Europe's needs, enabling governments there to set aside their own funds for military defense. (Congress and executive branch could never seem to agree on what Europeans were supposed to be doing first with their money.) There was also a "constitutional" concern. This arose from the powers assigned the President in the bill to transfer arms. Vandenberg, who had never believed the Treaty as a political alliance required much implementation, asserted with hyperbole unusual even for him that the bill made Truman "the personal umpire of this whole earth."[84]

In order to delay and perhaps to defeat further American involvement in Europe, Vandenberg and others insisted that, before all this military aid was given, the provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty for establishment of a Council and a Defense Committee should be carried out—that is, as with the European Recovery Program, the recipients should coordinate their demands and concert their strategies. After all, the U.S. commitment was to the European nations *jointly*, not to each nation separately. A common "strategic plan" would therefore have to be presented to Congress for appraisal. In effect, Vandenberg was making Article 3 dependent upon the execution of Article 9, dealing with organization. Vandenberg was joined in his "revolt" by another lapsing bipartisan, John Foster Dulles, who was now an appointive Senator from New York. Dulles' chief worry was Germany. If France received extensive American military equipment, he feared Germany might be entirely lost, "possibly going into a military alliance even with the Soviet Union."[85]

As a result of these arguments, the Military Assistance Program bill was redrafted to defer the bulk of the aid until an alliance organizational structure (into which Germany could be integrated) was drawn up. The MAP was made still more attractive when some members, especially Republicans on the west coast, insisted on the addition of some $75 million for expenditure "in the general area" of China. The bill did not finally pass both Houses of Congress, however, until another stunning world event: the announcement on 23 September that the Soviet Union had exploded an atomic bomb. This development, long dreaded, had not been anticipated for another several years. With the United States no longer able to rely on its strategic trump card, it needed to look to its, and others', strength in conventional military suits. "Once again," Acheson later wrote, "the Russians had come to the aid of an imperiled nonpartisan foreign policy, binding its wounds and rallying the divided Congress into accepting the Senate version of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program."[86] The bill was signed into law on 6 October 1949.

Now that the money was made available, the "O"—organization— was

put into the NAT Alliance. A Working Group had already prepared detailed recommendations. These were considered at the first meeting of the "North Atlantic Council" in Washington on 17 September 1949. Secretary Acheson accepted the Chairmanship of the body, thereafter to rotate. Besides instituting the Council itself, the conference generated a Defense Committee, a Military Committee, a Standing Group, and five Regional Planning Groups. The latter, of particular interest as evidence of the participants' strategic images, were: (1) the Northern European Group—Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom; (2) the Western European Group—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; (3) the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Group—France, Italy, and the United Kingdom; (4) the Canada-United States Group; and (5) the North Atlantic Group (all the members except Italy and Luxembourg). Note that the United States accepted full membership only on the Canada-United States and North Atlantic Groups. On the three geographically European planning bodies, it was only a "consulting member."[87]

The "Strategic Concept" worked out by the new NATO also showed the limitation of America's involvement in European defense. Approved by President Truman on 27 January 1950, this plan required each NATO member only to undertake the task for which it, given its location and capabilities, was "best suited." The primary responsibility of the United States would be strategic bombing ("with all types of weapons") and cooperation with Britain in securing sea and air lanes. "Initially, the hard core of ground forces will come from European nations," it was stipulated. "Other nations will give aid with the least possible delay and in accordance with over-all plans."[88] On the strength of this conceptual division of labor, admittedly vague, Truman was able to release the final payments to Europe under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

German Participation. American officials hoped at this point that the defenders of Europe would become able to arm themselves. Their confidence depended, however, on their European Allies' willingness to rely upon their recent enemy; Germany. The "equipment deficiencies" of the European members, the State Department suggested, might be met by the use of "available industrial capacity" in West Germany—now the Federal Republic of Germany under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer—"without violating existing security prohibitions."[89] What Washington really wanted was for the Federal Republic of Germany soon to be brought into NATO—in part as a surrogate for the United States.

This American line of argument, as yet tentative and oblique, made the French shudder. To have Germany reenter Europe through an organization whose primary character was military would be disastrous, they believed. The next steps would be a German defense industry, a German General Staff, a German High Command. Yet they did not wish to oppose Washington frontally. In order to broaden the whole discussion of Europe's problems and to make doubly sure that the United States would be in Europe at France's side in solving them, Premier Georges Bidault on 16 April 1950 proposed a "High Atlantic Council For Peace." He envisaged this as "a small group of select men"—a "civilian general staff for total diplomacy"—who would address themselves continuously to the larger problem of developing Western capacities "to win a cold war."[90] Bidault's shapeless proposal helped make Americans realize that if NATO were to be used as a mechanism for

integrating Germany into the West, it would have to perform more than military tasks. It would have to assume political and economic responsibilities as well.

Here, however, NATO competed with other postwar institutions, notably the new parliamentary Council of Europe and the Organization for European Economic Cooperarion. Its most potent rival in the nonmilitary field, however, emerged on 9 May 1950, when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced a plan to place all French and German coal and steel production under a common High Authority in an organization that would be open to other countries of Europe. This sharing of Franco-German bases of industrial production would be "the first srep toward European Federation."[91] The principal author of this scheme, which came ro include Italy, Belgium, rhe Netberlands, and Luxembourg, was the imaginative Jean Monnet, who served as the first President of the High Authoriry. Perhaps not wholly without intention, the founding of the European Coal and Steel Communiry (ECSC) had an indirect effect of deflating interest in developing NATO as an engine of social and economic progress in Europe. Henceforth, ir seemed, the function of NATO was ro be primarily tbat of providing a security "umbrella" for Europe, with the United States holding the handle from afar.

Effect of Korean War. This restricted conception of America's future role in Europe, even the defense field, was abruptly changed following sensarional news from the other side of the globe: on 25 June (Asia time) North Korean troops invaded South Korea. This seemed to mean, as the prevailing view was expressed by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sraff, that "communism is willing to use arms to gain its end." The presumably Soviet-backed move highlighted, as had an earlier National Security Council Study (NSC 68) following Russia's breaking of the American aromic monopoly, the military imbalance on the European front. Reports from Europe supplied details. Acheson recalled that "the Germans and the French, looking with apprehension at the sixty thousand East German military police and twenty-seven Russian divisions also in East Germany, with more behind them, found little comfort in NATO's twelve ill-equipped and uncoordinated divisions with little air support." Perhaps unconsciously, the pattern of Northeast Asia was projected upon that of Central Europe: divided Germany seemed analogous to divided Korea, the Elbe comparable to the 38th Parallel. The only way to restore an equilibrium in Europe and thus to preserve peace worldwide, it seemed to most officials (notably excepting George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, who believed that American and European statesmen were making a major interpretive error in reading the North Korean aggression as evidence of a global Soviet military offensive), was the rapid assignment of American ground troops to Europe. "The idea became prevalent," observed Bohlen, "that only armies actually in existence along the edge of danger could provide protecrion." Acheson gave classic expression to the new doctrine when he urged that, in the future, the United Srates deal from concrete "situations of strength."[92]

A European Army? The Pentagon, while agreeing that Europe's defenses needed "beefing up" (in its words), would not permit any diversion of American forces and equipment from the Far East to Europe, however, except as part of a coherent plan. The "beef" must come not just from the United States but also from Europe. There must be a big increase of the Allies' forces and—the stopper—the inclusion of

armed German units (division-sized). In order to integrate the whole transatlantic effort, a "unified command" should be formed. Moreover, all of these things should be done *simultaneously*. This—known as the "One Package" proposal—was a direct challenge to France.[93]

The French responded with their own scheme for harnessing Germany's potential military might. Known as the Pleven Plan, after the new Premier, René Pleven, it had the stated objecr of creating a true European Army ("a complete fusion of all human and material elements"). In this, the German units were to be kept so small they would scarcely realize they were German! Moreover, the Federal Republic would not actually be rearmed until a whole set of centralized (French-designed) European institutions was set in place. One of these would be a European Defense Ministry. Hence considerable delay could be anticipated.

Although inspired by fear and not well thought out, the Pleven Plan was consistent with the purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance. Germany would be allowed to contribute. The Plan promised that the European forces would be "placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic force" and would "operate in accordance with the contractual obligations of the Atlantic Pact."[94] It was thus a worthy answer to Washington.

The contest between the American and French designs for defense of the West was partially resolved by rhe so-called Spofford Compromise, skillfully engineered by Charles M. Spofford, American chairman of a new NATO Council Deputies Committee. This accord committed the American and European parties to German rearmament "in principle," the details to be worked out during "a transitional period." A meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels in December 1950 endorsed the Compromise, thereby clearing the way for the establishment of a real Atlantic defense system.

Military Integration. The first, and perhaps historically the most critical, step toward a unified NATO defense force was the appointment of a Supreme Commander. Whatever the military justification for this, it was considered almost a political and psychological necessity. "Europe does not respond to committees," Acheson observed.[95] For the title one name was preeminent: Dwight D. Eisenhower. Of the former SHAEF commander, Winston Churchill had written, "In General Eisenhower we have a man who set the unity of the Allied Armies above all nationalistic thoughts. In his Headquarters unity and strategy were the only reigning spirits."[96] The fact that Eisenhower was an *American* general was perhaps the decisive consideration. His appointment would embody the full commitment of the United States to Europe's defense. Moreover, European governments did not appear able to agree on one of their own for the joh. If there was any European candidate at all it was probably Montgomery, as prickly as Eisenhower was genial. No French general, given France's wartime record, had comparable distinction. The general officers of the smaller countries of Western Europe had never conducted large-scale military operations. A *German* supreme Commander was unthinkable. Montgomery himself, well aware of the controversy that moved with him, had taken his position as Western Union Commanders in Chief Chairman only on the condition that, should another world war break out, he would be free to step down. The "top post," he felt constrained to say, should go to an American.[97] His reluctance, insofar as it was based on an assumption that other European countries and the United States would never in the future

allow their troops to fight under anyone but an American, was notably unwarranted. The image of American military dominance at the end of World War II—the OVERLORD image—was still so powerful, however, that alternative patterns of leadership could scarcely be conceived.

The announcement of President Truman's designation of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander and decision to increase the number of American troops in Europe touched off the so-called Great Debate. Senator Kenneth Wherry ("the Nebraska undertaker," as Acheson viewed him) introduced a resolution to prohibit the assignment of any ground forces to the European area "for the purposes of" the North Atlantic Treaty. He feared that the troops' subordination to a "unified command"—even, or perhaps especially, one under an American commander—would permanently entangle the United States in European affairs. Senator Taft, who had to be taken seriously, acknowledged the need for a buildup of military manpower in Western Europe but did not approve the assignment of American troops to an integrated NATO command structure. The President, by committing American forces to "an international army," he argued, would be limiting his own prerogatives as Commander in Chief—and, more importantly, United States sovereignty.[98]

The legislative upshot of the Great Debate was Senate Resolution 99. This measure approved the appointment of Eisenhower. It also accepted the principle of the United States doing its "fair share" in Europe to defend the North Atlantic area. It went on, however, to register the Senate's view that "the major contribution" of ground forces would have to come from the Western European countries themselves and that no more than four additional American divisions (requested by the Pentagon) should be sent in implementation of Article 3 "without further congressional approval."

The final vote on S.R. 99 was 69-21, Taft finally voting for it. In a sense, this vote marked the completion of the postwar American diplomatic revolution. Coming on 4 April 1951, precisely 2 years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Resolution occasioned reflections on how far the nation had changed its attitude toward involvement in Europe and the world. As Senator Connally said at the end of the debate, "Certainly if there ever was any doubt on the part of our friends or potential enemies that the United States would be willing to implement the North Atlantic Treaty with ground troops, that doubt has now been dispelled." It is perhaps significant that when Secretary Acheson attributed to President Truman the bringing about of "a complete revolution" in American foreign policy, he cited not the North Atlantic Treaty itself—the formal commitment—but among other things, the "absolutely unprecedented" steps of placing "substantial forces" in Europe, putting them into "an integrated force," and agreeing to "a command structure" with "a supreme commander."[99]

How Lasting? How certain was it that American forces would stay in Europe, however? To the extent that the forces were then conceived as a counterbalance to the Soviet military presence in Europe, the answer to this question must depend on how Soviet policy was interpreted. It was at least imaginable to some knowledgeable officials in the West that the Soviet Union, whose penetration so far westward was historically abnormal, could one day be induced to withdraw. America could then disengage. To the extent, however, that the U.S. forces were understood as a contribution to a new, complex, self-contained Atlantic-European security "system," the answer could be "indefinitely." The very value

of NATO conceived in this way lay in its continuity of existence and generality of purpose—its responsiveness at any time to any threat, internal no less than external, nonmilitary as well as military. As already shown, some of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty considered the Alliance a way of holding down Germany and influencing the United States. To have American power engaged on the European continent was, from the Canadian and European points of view, to gain some positive control over it. The vagueness and looseness of the North Atlantic Treaty made such actual military integration, especially for the French, then seem imperative.[100]

The one way by which an indefinite American troop involvement in Europe might have been prevented at this time, it seems in retrospect, would have been via the creation of a strong *European* defense organization. When NATO was established, however, the one existing European military institution, the Brussels Force, was, in the later words of Lord Gladwyn, "reduced to a sort of vermiform appendix."[101] It is not inconceivable, however, that if Great Britain, particularly, had not been so eager to fold the Brussels Force in NATO, that body might have developed into an effective core for European defense.

The other possible European alternative to NATO was the French Government's plan for a European Army—the basis of the ill-destined European Defense Community Treaty of May 1952. Officials of the Truman administration finally decided that the best, and perhaps only, way to bring about German participation in Western defense was to give strong American support to the EDC project. Many American officials plainly did not like it. An important one who did, however, was SACEUR—General Eisenhower—who quickly became, in one characterization, a "hot gospeller European Union man."[102] Eisenhower's judgment appears to have been that, as long as political unity developed *pari passu* with a European Army, and as long as German troops were incorporated in the force in truly national units rather than mere regimental combat teams, the EDC could work. Although the evidence regarding his thinking is not conclusive, he gave at least some Europeans at the time including Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker, "the feeling that in the back of [his] mind was the idea that the creation of the EDC would allow him to send American boys home." Bevin's successor, Anthony Eden, received much the same impression. "As the European Army developed," Eden remembered, "it was his thought that maybe we and the Americans could be drawn into reserve. We should be there and available if needed, but it might be no bad thing if the Europeans could stand on their own." In short, Eisenhower seems to have believed, "We should help from without rather than from within."[103]

Conclusion. We are now in a position to reflect upon the genesis of NATO and to try to identify the main factors involved in the creation of that organization. In addition, we may briefly consider, in light of a more detailed knowledge of the concepts and circumstances that gave NATO birth, whether that body is well adapted to the present international environment. If it is not, do any of the alternative security schemes that were conceived in the late 1940s and early 1950s have possible relevance to the present? Does history, when its complexity and variety are appreciated, suggest forms for the future?

Any political institution that lasts more than a generation is sustained by forces greater than the energies of those who founded it. This is surely true of NATO, which has become an international fixture. The unprecedented

formation of a peacetime political-military alliance bridging the Atlantic Ocean is basically attributable to the inexorable pressures of the Second World War and the cold war, as well as powerful economic and social developments—notably the temporary collapse of Europe's economy and the permanent loss of its overseas empires. All of these factors tended to focus attention on the North American-Western European core area.

Nonetheless, without the conscious exertions by individual statesmen and governments, the North Atlantic Alliance—the treaty, the structure, the troops—would never have been organized. Particular major roles can retrospectively be assigned. The impetus came from Foreign Secretary Bevin, without whose initiative nothing might have happened. There is considerable merit in the opinion, held by Prime Minister Attlee, that the Atlantic Pact, like the Brussels Union, is "the work of Bevin."[104] Bevin's concept of a Western Union and of complementary regional associations nearby might never have been reshaped into an Atlantic-wide alliance, however, had it not been for the activity of other states—Norway, Canada, and, especially, the United States of America. The positive response of the Truman administration—Marshall, Lovett, Hickerson, Achilles, and others—was crucial. The involvement of Dean Acheson, though it came later, was also of vital importance. President Truman, perhaps in the best position to judge the relative contributions of everyone involved, later wrote, "There would have been no NATO without Dean Acheson." He specifically credits Acheson with driving home "the point that NATO would have no meaning at all unless a really joint effort was made at common defense and mutual aid."[105]

Here it is important to recognize the participation of Congress. Without its approval and support NATO would never have had either the popular endorsement or the economic wherewithal necessary to proceed. "Secretary Acheson and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett were... the chief architects for the United States in building the treaty structure," Senator Connally rightly observed. "But I think it safe to say that the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate furnished some of the stone and mixed some of the mortar to complete its symmetry and strength."[106]

Nor should the contributions of military statesmen be forgotten. One should cite at least the pathbreaking work of Montgomery and his UNIFORCE at Fontainebleau, the lucid expositions of Gruenther during the Washington talks and afterward, and, above all, the dynamic personification of NATO by its first Supreme Commander. "Once NATO came into existence," writes one of his successors in that role, "its success was determined, in large measure, by the enthusiasm of General Eisenhower."

There was another, hostile dominant personality of the era. A number of Western statesmen have been dubbed "father of the Atlantic Alliance," Paul-Henri Spaak (himself a claimant) has written. "Not one of them deserves the title. Without Stalin and his aggressive policies, without the threat with which he confronted the free world, the Atlantic Alliance would never have been born."[107] At times, it seems when the evidence is today examined, Western officials exaggerated the peril from the East. The warnings of an imminent Soviet-Norwegian non-aggression pact, a communist victory in the Italian elections, and a Red army thrust into the western zones of Germany are cases in point. Rumors of war were even, one must admit, sometimes deliberately manipulated—General Clay's telegram and its handling being an example. Nonetheless the pervasive insecurity that was

felt throughout Europe and the Western Hemisphere was genuine, and it was not for the most part, falsely grounded. In the circumsrances of the time, as even Charles Bohlen later acknowledged, "NATO was simply a necessity. The developing situation with the Soviet Union demanded the participation of the United States in the defense of Western Europe. Any other solution would have opened the area to Soviet domination, contrary to the interests of the United Srates and contrary to any decent world order."[108]

By 1953 NATO was a clear success. A few saw limits in it. "Today," correspondent Theodore H. White wrote at the time, "NATO is frozen about the decisions of 1948 and 1950. These decisions rightly saw the Atlantic Basin as the centerpiece in world strategy and moved to secure it; since then, the Atlantic Community has rigidly dedicated itself to the creation and equipment of military divisions in Western Europe."[109] There were new dangers to be faced in Asia and elsewhere, and not all of them were military in nature.

Nonetheless, the creation of NATO was, and remains, a considerable achievement. One participant interestingly assesses this as follows:

> Thirty years have now gone by and at leasr we have not had a war in Western Europe. Moreover it is quite possible that a good many difficulties between members of the Alliance may have been averted because of the cohesion brought about by NATO. Without NATO, the Marshall Plan could not have succeeded and Europe could not have moved into the most productive and peaceful period in its hisrory.

The historian is nonetheless tempted to ask: Might not some of the alternative schemes floating about in the late 1940s and the early 1950s for the defense of Europe and the West have accomplished much the same result? In particular, could not an enlarged Brussels Union or even the bolder European Defense Community scheme, if supported by the United States with massive milirary equipment aid, an offer of coordinated straregic planning, and even American participarion in periodic joint maneuvers in Europe, have performed a similar stabilizing role? The central lesson of the NATO experience has often been taken to be, as Dean Acheson expressed it in 1957: "The North Atlantic Treaty, its organization, and its military forces are recognition of the truth that no balance of power in Europe, or elsewhere, adequate to restrain Soviet power is possible unless the weight of the United States is put into the scales."[110] But, one must ask, does "the weight of the United States" necessarily mean the permanent stationing of large number of American troops abroad in a highly integrated, U.S.-dominated command structure?

It probably did not then but, given the existence of NATO, it perhaps does today. Nonetheless, one cannot help but note thar America's "weight," in relative terms, is not nearly so great as it once was. Europe, once economically prostrate, has been again on her feet for some time. In other regions of the world, too, there are potentially strong nations and international groupings. It is thus now perhaps time again to consider, more seriously than in the past, whether the defense of the Atlantic Community *in Europe* ought to be "Europeanized," enabling some portion of the U.S. forces there to be (as General Eisenhower and other founders of NATO anticipated) "drawn into reserve"—i.e., made available for use elsewhere.

It may further be time, given the world changes that President Carter remarked upon, to consider whether the scope of NATO, especially in geographical terms but also functionally,

ought to be broadened. "It is worth recalling today," writes one of the makers of the Alliance,

> that the treaty area, as defined in Article 6, is simply that in which an armed attack would constitute a *casus belli; there was never the slightest thought in the mind of the drafters that it should prevent collective planning, maneuvers or operations south of the Tropic of Cancer in the Atlantic Ocean, or in any other area important to the security of the Parties.*[11]

Article 4 allows for consultation about any problem anywhere that a member nation considers relevant to its own security. The conventional wisdom, however, has been—especially following the 1956 Suez fiasco—that the North Atlantic Alliance works well only so long as it confines its concern to its own area. This tradition is unduly restrictive. So, in truth, is the very idea of a "NATO area." The zones and issues of the international security arena are much more interrelated than they were. NATO members—acting individually or severally as *Allies* if not collectively as an *Alliance*—might well seek closer working ties of all kinds—informal "reliances" rather than formal "alliances"—with well-placed nations (e.g., Egypt) and multilateral organizations (e.g., ASEAN) elsewhere to form a global network of security, in the very broadest sense of that term. Given the economic disparities between the North Atlantic partners and many of the countries upon which they may increasingly rely, Article 2 may gain new importance.

Ideally, global security should be guaranteed by cooperation in the United Nations. It should not be forgotten that NATO—an Article 51 association—was formed under the aegis of the United Nations for the avowed purpose of strengthening that organization. For most participants, this was not cynical. If neither organization proves effective, however, it may become necessary, in President Truman's words of 1949, to take yet another "long step toward permanent peace in the whole world."

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Alan K. Henrickson was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and Harvard University, receiving the Ph.D. degree from the latter. He is Associate Professor of Diplomatic History at The Fletcher School, Tufts University. He is also Associate and a member of the Canada-United States Study Group at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. During academic year 1978-79 he was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. His most recent publication is "America's Changing Place in the World: From 'Periphery' to 'Centre'?", a chapter in Jean Gottman, ed., *Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variations in Politics.*

NOTES

1. Address by President Harry S. Truman, 4 April 1949, *The Department of State Bulletin* [hereinafter DOSB], 17 April 1949, pp. 481-482.

2. Address by President Jimmy Carter, *The New York Times*, 23 May 1977, p. 1.

3. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969). Acheson's title is taken from a quotation on his frontispiece by Alphonso X, the Learned, King of Spain (1252-1284): "Had I been present at the creation I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe."

4. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (New York: Norton, 1973), p. 267.

5. This and subsequent unattributed quotations (unfootnoted) are from written or oral statements by former or present government officials to the author.

6. Gordon A. Craig, "The United States and the European Balance," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, pp. 187-198.

7. Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 36. See also Theodore C. Achilles, "U.S. Role in Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance," Part 1, *NATO Review*, August 1979, pp. 11-14. Bevin expressed similar views to French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault.

8. Reid, p. 37.

9. The specific content of Bevin's proposal owes much to his principal Foreign Office assistant, Gladwyn Jebb, who drafted the basic text of the speech. Cf. Lord Gladwyn, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 209-213.

10. Reid, pp. 29-35; Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of The Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson: Vol. 2, 1948-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 40-41; Lord Ismay, *NATO, The First Five Years, 1949-1954* (Utrecht: Bosch, 1954), p. 7. A widely discussed scheme similar to the Canadian project was that proposed by *Foreign Affairs* editor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, for the adherence of like-minded states to a protocol (modeled on the Geneva Protocol of 1924). This would permit collective enforcement action when and if the Security Council failed to act. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Is It Russia vs. U.S.—Or vs. U.N.?" *The New York Times Magazine*, 14 September 1947; revised version in Armstrong, *The Calculated Risk* (London: Macmillan, 1947).

11. Paul-Henri Spaak, *The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, 1936-1966* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 143.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-148; Gladwyn, pp. 210-211; Alexander Rendel, "The Alliance's Anxious Birth," *NATO Review*, June 1979, pp. 15-20.

13. At London, Marshall had suggested consultation among the General Staffs. Soon afterward, at a fort near New York, Gens. Matthew Ridgway, Pierre Billotte, and Sir Frederick Morgan met to discuss common American, French, and British strategic problems. Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 286.

14. Cf. Dean Acheson, *Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known* (New York: Harper, 1962), chap. I.

15. John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 228-229; Theodore H. White, *Fire in the Ashes: Europe in Mid-Century* (New York: Sloane, 1953), p. 288; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 398; Reid, pp. 37-38.

16. Report by George C. Marshall, 19 December 1947, *DOSB*, 28 December 1947, pp. 1244-1247.

17. This point is well developed by Timothy P. Ireland. He argues that, implausible as it may seem, many Europeans (particularly the French) considered the *long-term* danger to the European balance to be that of German, not Soviet, domination. See Timothy Patrick Ireland, "Germany, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Entangling Alliance," Ph.D. Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Cambridge, Mass., 1978. "As the French Government sees it," Ambassador Jefferson Caffery cabled from Paris, "the Western democracies are faced with (1) an eventual threat, which is Germany; (2) an actual threat, which is the Soviet Union; (3) an immediate threat which is Soviet action in Germany." Caffery to Marshall, 29 June 1948, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereinafter *FRUS*], *1948*, v. III, pp. 142-143. This is a typical formulation.

18. Hickerson memorandum, 21 January 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 9-12.

19. Hickerson memorandum to Marshall, 19 January 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 6-7. Achilles describes Hickerson's role as follows: "Hickerson led the fight within the U.S. Government for full participation." Achilles, p. 12.

20. Kennan, pp. 346, 399. The Canadian Government viewed Kennan and Bohlen as the two main bureaucratic opponents of a transatlantic treaty in the Truman administration. Whenever there was a lull in the intergovernmental discussions, it seemed from Ottawa, they could be depended upon to "counterattack." Reid, p. 50.

21. Kennan memorandum to Marshall, 20 January 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 7-8; Kennan, p. 399.

22. Inverchapel to Lovett, 6 February 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 19-20.

23. See Josef Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948: The Failure of Coexistence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

24. Gladwyn, p. 213.

25. White, p. 295; Theodore H. White, *In Search of History: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 341. Lord Gladwyn attributes much the same comment to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer. Gladwyn, p. 213. On the military balance, also see Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power* (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp. 48-49, and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 10-11.

26. Lucius D. Clay, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945-1949* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1974), v. 2, pp. 568-569. See also Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1950), pp. 354-355.

27. James Forrestal, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 387-388; Clay, *Papers*, p. 569; Feis, p. 296; Kennan, pp. 399-400.

28. Philip M. Burgess, *Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1968), p. 98. On Norwegian foreign policy at this time, see also Magne Skodvin, *Norden Eller NATO? Utenriksdepartementet og alliansespørsmålet, 1947-1949* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), pp. 90-122, and Knut Einar Eriksen, *DNA og NATO: Striden om norsk NATO-medlemskap innen regjeringspartiet 1948-49* (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1972), pp. 72-97.

29. British Embassy to Department of State, 11 March 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 46-48; Forrestal, p. 392; Reid, pp. 42-43; Pearson, pp. 41-42.

30. Hickerson to Marshall, 8 March 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 40-42.

31. Kennan to Marshall, 15 March 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 848-849. In a handwritten notation on Kennan's cable, Hickerson advised that, because action against the Communist Party would be "certain to cause civil war" and because the non-Communist Parties in Italy had "a good chance of winning" without such drastic steps, the "action recommended by GFK seems unwise." Kennan does not mention his proposal in his memoirs. He does discuss it, however, in a letter to the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, April 1978, pp. 643-645.

32. In his famous July 1947 statement of the containment idea in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, Kennan had recommended, ambiguously, "the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (New York: Mentor, 1952), p. 99.

33. British Embassy to Department of State, 11 March 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 46-48.

34. Gladwyn, p. 214.

35. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 241-243.

36. Achilles, p. 12.

37. The Soviet Government, due to the involvement in the talks of British Embassy First Secretary (and Soviet spy) Donald MacLean, was, presumably, fully informed of the three powers' secret deliberations. Given the ultimate success of the alliance talks, this, ironically, may have been a "good thing." A deterrent influence was perhaps conveyed through espionage that would not yet have been projected publicly.

38. Paraphrase of Bevin telegram, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 79-80. The scope of a security arrangement depended in part on *which* U.N. principles were relied upon. Article 51 of the Charter (on "individual and collective self-defense") implies no geographical limitation. By contrast, the articles of Chapter VIII, "Regional arrangements," are more restrictive not only gengraphically but in that enforcement action is not permitted without the Security Council's authorizatinn.

39. Richard H. Heindel, et al., "The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate," *The American Journal of International Law*, October 1949, pp. 633-665.

40. Minutes of Second Meeting of U.S.-U.K.-Canada Security Conversations, 23 March 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 64-66.

41. *Ibid.*

42. Reid, p. 105.

43. Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 204.

44. Washington and London agreed on 2 September 1940 that, in return for the transfer of 50 "overage" destroyers and certain other (unspecified) weapons from the United States, Britain would lease without charge for 99 years 6 naval and air station sites in the Caribbean, and also grant the right to develop similar facilities in Newfoundland and Bermuda.

45. Paraphrase of Bevin telegram, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 79-80.

46. Acheson, *Sketches*, chap. VI; Kennan, *Memoirs*, pp. 404-406; Achilles, p. 12; Daryl J. Hudson, "Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolutinn 239 and American Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History*, Winter 1977, pp. 46-63, which emphasizes Vandenberg's own substantive contributions. It is noteworthy that, in presenting the resolution text that he and Lovett had worked out to the Foreign Relations Committee, Vandenberg argued that "the whole purpose is to avoid any direct alliance, or the whole purpose is to retain complete freedom of action on our part with respect to the evolution of events, but it is to underscore the fact that there are in the United Nations Charter, regardless of the veto, certain devices which likeminded peace-loving members of the United Nations can embrace as we have done in a spectacular example in the Rio Treaty, for the purpose of protecting national security." U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), pp. 1-3.

47. The other provisions dealing with defense arrangements are Articles 2 and 4. The rest deal with peacemaking and peacekeeping under the United Nations.

48. Clay, *Decision*, p. 355.

49. Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers* (London: Heinemann, 1961), p. 172.

50. Achilles, p. 13.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

52. Reid, p. 63.

53. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 277. One European participant recalls of Acheson, "He was a very good chairman of the negotiating body although perhaps not quite so easy-going as Lovett, and it was a great advantage to have the Secretary of State in the chair. And, of course, all the time he was having to struggle with Congress—very successfully too."

54. Reid, p. 139.

55. Theodore C. Achilles, "US Role in Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance," Part 2, *NATO Review*, October 1979, p. 17.

56. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 277; Reid, pp. 172, 173.

57. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 277. If anything, Acheson's corrosive skepticism toward Article 2, whose very inclusion in the Treaty the Canadians considered a success, increased Ottawa's determination to prove its practical value. See Pearson, pp. 57-58, and Reid, p. 178.

58. Heindel, et al., p. 653.

59. Achilles suggests that the Canadians in February 1952 had an opportunity to invoke Article 2 in order to lift a minor U.S. restriction on the importation of woodpulp, but they "got cold feet." Achilles, Part 2, p. 17n. For a discussion of recent nonmilitary activities related to NATO, see Joseph M.A.H. Luns, "Thirty Years Later—Aims of the Alliance Still Valid," *NATO Review*, April 1979, pp. 3-8.

60. Achilles, Part 2, p. 16.

61. Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 8 July 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 163-169; Forrestal to Acheson, 10 February 1949, *FRUS, 1949*, v. IV, pp. 95-101. On the origins of an Arctic focus in American strategic thinking, see Alan K. Henrikson, "The Map as an 'Idea': The Role of Cartographic Imagery During the Second World War," *The American Cartographer*, April 1975, pp. 19-53.

62. Andre Beaufre, *NATO and Europe* (New York: Knopf, 1966), p. 26.

63. Reid, pp. 200-211, 213-218; Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of Washington Exploratory Talks, 22 December 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 324-332; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 279; Achilles, Part 2, p. 17. The Algerian departments of France were to be defended against "armed attacks" but not against internal rebellion. Some of the signatories probably had no intention of defending Algeria against external attack by *Arab* countries. They could argue that "the security of the North Atlantic area" was not threatened. Thus the French diplomatic victory was rather a hollow one.

64. Reid, p. 201. When Senator Vandenberg voiced reservations about including Italy in an "Atlantic" alliance, Ernest Gross of the State Department took Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther (Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to see Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, upon whom Vandenberg relied heavily for military advice. Gruenther "masterfully" explained to Lodge the strategic importance of the Mediterranean, going all the way back to Hannibal. Vandenberg's doubts thereafter appeared resolved. Conversation with Ernest A. Gross, 26 November 1979.

65. Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 8 July 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 163-169; Memorandum by Participants in Washington Security Talks, 9 September 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 237-248; Reid, p. 199; Dirk U. Stikker, *Men of Responsibility: A Memoir* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 285.

66. Kennan, *Memoirs*, p. 408.

67. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 280.

68. State Department Policy Paper, *FRUS, 1948*, v. II, pp. 61-62; paraphrase of Bevin telegram, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 79-80.

69. Kennan, *Memoirs*, p. 409; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 280. Acheson, no legal formalist, also recognized "the weakness of words to bind, especially when the juice of continued purpose is squeezed out of them and their husks analyzed to a dryly logical extreme."

70. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 159.

71. Minutes of Fourth Meeting of U.S.-U.K.-Canada Security Conversations, 29 March 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. III, pp. 69-70. This may be seen as a foreshadowing of the doctrine of "massive retaliation," a strategy more heavily reliant on atomic weapons.

72. Stikker, p. 283; Bell, p. 42.

73. Heindel, et al., p. 642.

74. Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Recent American Foreign Policy: Conflicting Interpretations* (Homewnod, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 82-83.

75. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *North Atlantic Treaty*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949)., p. 13; Acheson *Present at the Creation*, p. 283.

76. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *North Atlantic Treaty*, p. 47; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 285.

77. Marshall to Douglas, 28 February 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, v. II, pp. 101-102.

78. Reid, pp. 164-166; Minutes of Eighteenth Meeting of Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 15 March 1949, *FRUS, 1949*, v. IV, pp. 213-224.

79. On the differing strategic implications of the Rio, Brussels, and North Atlantic Treaties, see Reid, pp. 146-147.

80. Lawrence S. Kaplan, "The United States and the Atlantic Alliance: The First Generation," in John Braeman, et al., eds., *Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), pp. 294-342, especially pp. 307-308. On the geographical link of the Monroe Doctrine, see Henrickson, pp. 28-31.

81. Acheson, quoted in Truman, pp. 254-256.

82. Marquis Childs, "Washington and the Atlantic Pact," *Yale Review*, June 1949, pp. 577-587, quoted in Ireland.

83. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty*, pp. 169, 183.

84. U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, *Military Assistance Program: 1949*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), p. 23.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

86. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 313.

87. Report of Working Group in Organization to North Atlantic Council, *FRUS, 1949*, v. IV, pp. 330-337, and Ismay, pp. 25, 26. Canada was a consulting member in only one European group, that pertaining to Western Europe.

88. Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, *FRUS, 1949*, v. IV, pp. 353-356, and Ismay, p. 27.

89. Acheson to Douglas, 23 March 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, v. III, pp. 32-33.

90. Bruce to Acheson, 22 April 1950, and Bruce to Acheson, 25 April 1950, *FRUS 1950*, v. III, pp. 60-65.

91. Quoted in F. Roy Willis, *Europe in the Global Age: 1939 to the Present* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971), p. 318.

92. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 436; Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense After World War II* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 23; Kennan, *Memoirs*, pp. 497-500; Bohlen, pp. 292-293, 303-305; Bell, p. 6. For a review of recent literature, see Geoffrey Warner, "The Korean War," *International Affairs*, January 1980, pp. 98-107.

93. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 437.

94. Ismay, p. 33.

95. A State Department policy paper admitted: "It may be necessary to split the European region as was done between SHAEF and the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean in World War II. Operations in wartime in the European Theater may not be mutually supporting and may be of a greater extent than a single commander can effectively control." "Establishment of a European Defense Force," enclosed in Matthews to Burns, 16 August 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, v. III, pp. 211-219. Acheson remarks, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Reviews of the World Situation: 1949-1950*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), p. 433.

96. Ismay, p. 35.

97. Bernard L. Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein* (Cleveland: World, 1958), p. 453.

98. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 364, 494-495.

99. U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 4 April 1951 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951), v. 97, p. 3282; Truman, pp. 254-256.

100. Beaufre, p. 28. Beaufre finds it "amusing to recall that the idea of integration to which we now object was of French origin," p. 26.

101. Gladwyn, p. 222

102. White, *Fire in the Ashes*, p. 274.

103. C.L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934-1954* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 615, 710; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Vol. I, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 13, 15; Stikker, pp. 303-304. Henry E. Eccles recalls that, when Eisenhower was asked at a meeting in Paris late in 1951 how long he thought American troops would stay in Europe, he replied, "6 to 7 years." Conversation with Admiral Eccles, 10 November 1979. Eisenhower as President said that U.S. forces in Europe should be reduced by about 50 percent.

104. C.R. Attlee, *As It Happened* (New York: Viking Press, 1954), p. 239.

105. Truman, p. 253.

106. Heindel, vol. II, p. 636.

107. Spaak, p. 141.
108. Bohlen, p. 267.
109. White, *Fire in the Ashes*, p. 314.
110. Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (New York: Atheneum, 1962), p. 84.
111. Achilles, Part 2, p. 17.